Societal need for crisis-time equipping

7. Societal need for crisis-time equipping

In this section our aim is to give examples of:

the necessary steps for society to be able to survive a crisis, or the "winter of war",
including technological preparations, and
administrative preparations, including training sessions sessions for both community employees and the general population.

7.0 The present vulnerability of our society is indefensible.

With planned emergency provisions, a society can survive a cold winter, even with blockades, sabotage, and war.
Changes will require new ways of thinking among personnel at all levels: national and local politicians, technicians, various groups and individuals. (Excerpt from the book manuscript, "The Great Energy Deception," by Kenneth Walve, and Sam Ekholm.)

7.1 Vulnerability can be reduced

Most of us in Sweden have experienced electrical outages. They have often been short, with the power coming back on after a few minutes. Those minutes, however, have been profitable, since they have given us pause for reflection. Think what would happen if the electricity didn't come back before tomorrow ... or next week...?

In the minitext to illustration 3.8 och 3.9 we have highlighted our modern, but vulnerable, society. Is then this situation hopeless? Is there nothing an ordinary citizen can do? What political actions are necessary?

We who write this suggest that the battle is not lost. It is possible to complement our current energy system so that the country's inhabitants will at least manage to survive. But for this, it is at the minimum required that we consciously invest in emergency provisions of energy, water, and food.We will ask these question concerning the supply of electricity.

Efforts must be carried out on different levels

Nationally: The possibility to be able to improvise the output of the large-scale power system must be increased. It must be possible to be able to make use of power plants even if the large-scale power network is damaged by sabotage and/or acts of war. This would require modifications to the power plants, as well as additional training. The training would apply to both those who work in the power plant, and those who operate the electrical network.
Locally: Even with broad possibilities of improvising the output of the large-scale electrical system, not all consumers will have power. Perhaps entire cities would be without power for weeks at a time. To handle this would require planning at the community level.
Individually: None of us are free from personal responsibility. We must both be aware of what is done in the community, and what we ourselves can contribute. This particularly applies to homeowners, as we will soon describe.

7.2 Emergency resources for electricity and heating

What amount of electricity and heating do we need for survival? Theoretically, it would perhaps be sufficient with 20% of the peacetime need. But this requires technical solutions, and planning which is unfortunately seldom done.

Emergency energy supplies should be managed completely with domestically available energy such as wood, peat, water power, and small wind-power plants (200 - 300 kW each). Domestic alternative energy sources have been more expensive, and will probably always remain so, compared with today's large-scale, automated peace-time productions of heat and electricity. But if it becomes a question of providing for survival in crises, we should all be willing to pay more for limited production.

Our proposal is:

Keep nuclear power as long as it is safe, in order to provide power on a national level if at all possible. The nuclear fuel in a nuclear power plant is sufficient for 2 years of running. Larger fuel supplies would be easy to arrange. The more critical issue is the need for spare parts.
To instead invest about 10 - 30% of liquidation costs into creating an emergency supply based entirely upon domestic alternatives. In this way, we would help to get these started, and be able to see how they work, and how much they cost.
In order to assure that the emergency supplies function in times of crisis, they would probably need to be partially operated now and then during peacetime. Let a minimal tax on peacetime production pay the difference in operating costs.

The whole thing would be considerably less expensive than "to liquidate" nuclear power. At the same time, we create a solid defense with the energy of Sweden which can serve as a pattern for other countries.

7.3 What is required of the local government?

The local districts have a key role in the supply of energy, water, waste management, and other services, both in peacetime, and during crises and war.
The district government is the highest civil total defense authority on the local level. On January 1, 1987, the local districts took over the leadership of the local civil defense activities under conditions of preparedness. By this time, planning should naturally have been drawn up. A list of some of the areas of community responsibility follows below:

Energy - Plans should be in place to provide adequate supply, distribution and usage of energy in the community during peacetime.

Environment - The community government should see to it that environmental ordinances are followed by businesses within the district. (Previous supervision from the county government functioned poorly, so hope is now placed in the local community.) A sub-area which is included is:

Radon - Each community is responsible through their housing authority to stop new building on property with high radon concentration. Also, through the health care authority, each existing building with high radon levels shall be identified, and their owners are to be given support in cleansing them from radon. This work progresses extremely tediously

War and crisis - As we have already mentioned, the local district shall direct the local civil defense activities under conditions of preparedness. Further, the community shall have drawn up plans for the following:

leadership plan
information plan
defense plan
plans for social service
electricity and heating supplies
school operations
collective food distribution

In the Swedish defense proposition of 1986/87, it was emphasized to:

give attention to making plans, with training and education activities. "In this way the practicality of drawn-up plans can be tested."
analyze the consequences of disruptions in peacetime as well as during crises and war.
study the consequences involving the technical aspects of community supply safety (water, heating, waste removal, electricity). "The experience of previous years shows that the availability of reserve power for use in peacetime is of great significance for both communities and counties acting as business entities."

Serious question which each member of the community should ask themselves:

Has our district leadership taken the task seriously? Are the plans more than just on paper?
How are the necessary resources obtained, and where is the staff of planners and technicians within our community who follow up on the plans, and test their practicality?

7.4 Steps to minimize vulnerability

- an example from one community
Jarfalla is a typical example of the many large communities in our country which grew up after the second world war. (Jarfalla is a community which lies some 20 km northwest of Stockholm). In the area of energy, Jarfalla is completely dependent upon centralized electricity and heat production. To its advantage, it has a strong economy, and high environmental standards. In 1980, the community contained approximately:

13,000 apartments in multi-story buildings which received their heating supply from a distant heat production plant
2,000 houses with oil heating
6,000 houses with electrical heating
a total of 21,000 apartments

7.4.1 Energy crises
The disadvantage of the energy supply of Sweden and this model community is its great vulnerability, so that all or most of our existence is threatened.

Oil shortage - If Sweden is blockaded from oil imports, an oil shortage would occur in the country within one year. This means that oil for the centralized heating plants would run out before there was time to rebuild them to use alternative, domestic fuels such as peat or wood. The multi- story apartment buildings would then become uninhabitable during the winter time.

Electricity cut-off - A winter time cut-off of electricity, possibly due to sabotage, would hit even harder. Within 3 days, both apartments and houses would be uninhabitable. Drinking water pipes and the heating system would break due to freezing, and the drains could back up and overflow.

7.4.2 Possible counter-measures
By means of a few relatively simple counter-measures, undertaken in time, we can minimize our vulnerability and increase the chance for survival, even in nationwide crisis situations. These measures can be divided into two groups:

Energy conservation measures - By undertaking a few relatively inexpensive steps, energy consumption can be reduced 20-40%, so that emergency production can be more easily managed.
Survival in crises - Survival in houses is simplest to manage. In order to be able to continue to live in multi-story buildings requires more preparations.

7.4.3 Goals and resources for survival
A first goal should be that Jarfalla should be able to survive an entire crisis winter. Such a crisis would imply a long-term oil shortageor a short-term electrical outage, during which multi-story buildings would become uninhabitable. People would survive then if 2-3 families moved together in every house which was re-built in accordance with the above. Appendix 7.1 - 7.2 (below) shows the necessary measures for houses warmed by electricity or oil.

The next goal could be that everyone would stay in their ordinary apartments. This requires, among other things, a new furnace with lowered heating expectations, that is without hot water and keeping a temperature of 10-15 degrees Celsius indoors.

The first goal can be attained through private initiative among the homeowners.
The next goal,on the other hand, requires more comprehensive measures from not only the community, but also from the housing organizations.

In order to be able to continue living in the multi-story apartments requires greater measures than for the houses. One possibility would be to refurbish the large centralized heating facility to burn alternative fuels. A simpler alternative is to reintroduce localized heating facilities, but this time using alternative fuels. In either case, local emergency electricity is also required for pumping the heat from the heating facility to the buildings, and for running smoke exhaust fans.

In both scenarios, it seems desirable that non-political organizations, such as our churches, become involved. Their assignment would be to waken the people, and to create a people- movement for energy conservation in communities, in coordination with responsible community offices.

(The text for this chapter on the Jarfalla community comprises a reworking of a report given out by a preparedness group in 1980 from the Jarfalla Pentecostal congregation (Aspnas church), together with Sam Ekholm.)

7.5 Local-scale demonstration

In most communities, the commitment to preparation for electrical outages is poor. The general public is content to think that the community leadership and the energy department will solve the problem. In the community leadership, one is often content with having some paper plans, and making some isolated efforts. However, in order for the local population themselves to be able to understand the situation, a community demonstration of preparedness is needed. What follows is a brief demonstration of how this should be done.

7.5.1 Assumptions: (3 phases)
The threatening situation (scenario) which exists in the background is the following, but the tests must naturally be limited in time and space.

Suppose that the community is subjected to 48 hours of electrical outage during a cold winter, as result of damage to the transformers which supply the community network.
After these two days, electricity can be delivered to the community, but only in limited measure (1/5 of the maximum need, through emergency re-connections in the electrical network. This situation is assumed to last for 2 weeks.
After this, half of the normal supply can occur.

Demonstration of the first 48 hours (phase 1)
To do a full-scale demonstration can be dangerous for human life. Therefore, the demonstration is limited to separate parts of the local preparedness plans. Some examples are given below.

The community has determined, for example, that a couple of schools should function as public feeding areas. How this should actually work must then be demonstrated, since the electricity to the school has been cut off.
The housing areas which cannot be kept warm need to evacuated after 6 - 20 hours. Some housing areas are therefore chosen to demonstrate to the community how living quarters can be arranged, despite the cut-off of electricity.
The supply of water is to be demonstrated. If no emergency supply of electricity is available for water pumps, tap water will run out after perhaps 6 hours. This is to be assumed, for example, in conjunction with the public food assistance.
Transportation should be able to be managed by people and emergency personnel. If the gas stations in the community do not have backup generators, it is assumed that neither gasoline nor oil can be obtained.
Communication to the inhabitants of the community is to be demonstrated. Can the local radio stations manage without electricity from the network? Are there other ways to reach the population of the community with information? Telephone is presumed to be cut off after 8 hours. At that time, the backup batteries at the telephone companies would be exhausted, unless they have special emergency generators
If the community has a power plant in its area, it may be used. But it must be shown that it can be started without electricity from the outside. Standard procedures for "isolated operation" should also be tested.

The demonstrations in accordance with the above must naturally be combined in various ways. For example, transportation must be able to make it to the feeding locations.

Demonstration of the two subsequent weeks (phase 2)
The demonstrations for this phase can probably be shortened down to one or two days. It must be demonstrated how the limited amount of electricity can be utilized. This is primarily a technical question for the energy utility of that district.

For example, it must be shown that reconnections in the electrical network can be carried out so that the limited electricity can be prioritized for the most necessary operations in the society. These would include such as public lighting, the operation of certain heating facilities and circulation pumps for the non-local heating water, running of feeding centers, and electricity for grocery stores in order to save the refrigerated foods.
If this cannot be accomplished, it should at least be demonstrated how electrical reconnections can be made to supply electricity to various housing areas for several hours at a time.

7.5.2 The demonstrations should be public
It is important that larger demonstrations are observed by the press and other interested parties. The first demonstration might be a disastrous experience as a result of shocking, unexpected events. But this would then become a motivation for the politicians and inhabitants of the community. Furthermore, it then becomes easier to gain popular support when money is needed to be allocated for reducing public risk.
The next demonstration, some years later, after arranging for emergency supplies of heat and electricity, could perhaps become a community festival, despite a serious theme.

7.6 We need to wake up and realize our situation

Preparedness planning is partially secretive. Therefore, let us compare with how things are done with another crisis plan which is public, namely radon mitigration. (clean-up.)

7.6.1 Slow going with radon clean-up
In the middle of the 1990's, I understood the situation to be more or less the following:
Despite the great amount of public awareness, that 30% of all Swedish lungcancer-cases are caused by radon, the Swedish mitigration program has progressed too slowly. With the present maximum value of 200 Bq/cubic meter radon content, approximately 1 out of 10 Swedes live in houses above the limit. However, only 1 out of 10 are aware of this fact. In the long term up to 30% of all Swedish houses would need corrective measures.
Of all the houses which exceeded the former higher maximum acceptable value of radon, only 10% had been identified, and only 2% had been treated, in spite of 10 years of labor. The corrective measures had for the most part been carried out in the more conscientious communities of the country. The corrective measures were unsuccessful in 30-40% of the houses treated.
Overall, half of our communities had done nothing at all. Some had not even stopped building new houses which exceeded the radon limit. As a result, they can legally be considered as law-breakers, but without any risk of prosecution.

When businesses or individuals break the law's requirements, they risk prosecution and imprisonment. But communities can continue on as if nothing had happened.

7.6.2 An even slower pace for preparedness planning?
We are afraid that the preparedness planning of many communities is handled even worse than the radon clean-up, using the "secret stamp" as a cover.

7.6.3 Therefore, a grass-roots movement is needed
The only way to accomplish a sufficiently radical change is that the community inhabitants:

begin to demand that the community leadership gives an accounting of the current status of radon clean-up and preparedness planning, and show the current plan for carrying out the legally required measures within a reasonable time.
and once people have become informed of the situation, that they also actively participate in energy- and clean-up groups in order to complete the assignments with a 5-10 year period.

We need an awakening which engages people in Swedish radon clean-up and in crisis preparedness.

We can receive inspiration from the people-movements in the eastern countries, which resulted in the fall of the iron curtain, and which began to transform their sluggish, bureaucratic system.

Supplement 7.1

1 Energy conservation measures:

Insulate against heat loss
Tighten windows
Put reflective material behind electrical heating elements
Individually improved regulation of heating elements
Use different day and night temperatures.
Install triple glasses in windows (extra inner pane = inexpensive; triple panes = expensive)
Heat recovery from exhaust ventilation
Solar panels for pools and warm water.

Measures 1 - 6 are inexpensive ($125 - $625, plus your own labor).
Measures 7 - 8 are expensive ($3000 - $5000 each, plus your own labor).

2. Survival in homes

2.1 Electrically heated homes, supplies with:

Fireplace for wood or peat
Alternative cooking facilities without electricity
Drinking water from a well, or lake-water filtered with a Carbon filter
Food reserves
Outhouse

2.2 Oil-heated home, supplies with:

Combination furnace, or
Fireplace for wood or peat
Cooking facilities, if not included in the fireplace area
Drinking water from a well, or sea-water filtered with a Carbon filter
Food reserves
Outhouse
Antifreeze in the heating system
Emergency electrical generator for circulation pumps and for the oil burner

Supplement 7.2

Community crisis: standard preparations

The following steps are required:

Step 1a	Survival in homes for 3 weeks Multi-story buildings must be evacuated 2-3 families in each home Homes are equipped with: (provided by the individual homeowners) Fireplace for wood or peat, along with cooking facilities drinking water from a well or lake food supplies for 3 weeks outhouse antifreeze in the heating system emergency electrical generators for the circulation pumps
Step 1b	Survival in homes for several years limited fuel and grocery transport must be allowed for emergency electricity generation
Step 2a	Continue living in usual housing for 3 months (Preparations made by the housing organizations and the community authorities, and the power companies) The current high standard could not be maintained even one day during the winter. A lowered standard could mean- no hot water, and 10-15 degrees Celsius indoors. Preparations according step 1b, plus Local heating facilities for peat, wood (no exhaust smoke purification) fuel reserves local, limited electricity production, or restoration of the central power plant
Step 2b	Continue living in usual housing for a longer time long term availability of food, fuel, and electricity must be assured.

Supplement 7.3

Critical breaking points affecting vulnerability

Time	Operation	Consequences
1 second	Magnetic cranes	Material falls
	Flight controlling	Flight safety is compromised
	Operating lights
	Computers	The system crashes, and information can be lost.
	Processing plants	Processes stop, and have a long re-start time.
1 minute	Intensive care	(Respirators, dialysis, etc )
10-15 minutes	Foundries	Molten material "hanging" in cranes must be taken down.
10-15 minutes	Computers with only battery backup	The system shuts down without information loss.
15-30 minutes	Poultry-raising in large facilities	Death of the animals
15-30 minutes	Elevators	Those trapped inside have an unpleasant experience, specially without outside contact.
30 minutes	Subways	Trauma for those trapped in tunnels.
	Processing plants	Ovens, tubes re-set; re-start time could be days.
	Foundries	Risk of damage in blast-furnaces, etc.
2 hours	Large hog farms	Lack of ventilation can lead to suffocation of animals.
	Milk cows	Reduction in daily yield
	Water supply	At higher elevations, many more lose water.
6 hours	Foundries	Molten material solidifies in ovens; several weeks of down time.
6 hours	Greenhouses	Depending on the season, damage due to dryness or freezing.
8 hours	Water supply	Large regions of the network risk contamination
	Heating supply	Care facilities at risk
	Infants	Hygiene, food.
	Milk cows	Risk of udder inflammation, and permanently lowered yield
	Train signals, etc.	Train traffic nearly ceases, even if driving power avail.
10 hours	Telephone operations with battery reserves	Disruption in service
12 - 24 hours	Humans and animals	Lack of water and appropriate food.
	Highway transportation	Fuel tanks empty.
	Groceries	Cooled and frozen foods lose their storage life, and gradually perish. Distribution of groceries to consumers becomes difficult.
	Buildings, living areas	Lose their heat in winter time (much earlier in certain buildings)
	Waste management	Risk that the biological treatments collapse, with a re-start time of up to 14 days.
Few days	Everyday life	Ceases to function. Many work-placesand service establishments are closed.
Few days	Emergency-electrical supply	Problems begin to arise: Emergency Fuel reserves exhausted (after 3-5 days for tele- and radio networks. Need of maintenance etc.